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Institutional Investors and Corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance Policies:  
Evidence from Toxics Release Data 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper studies the role of institutional investors in influencing corporate environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) policies by analyzing the relation between institutional ownership and toxic release from 
facilities to which institutions are geographically proximate. We develop a local preference hypothesis 
based on the delegated philanthropy and transaction-costs theories. Consistent with the hypothesis, local 
institutional ownership is negatively related to facility toxic release. The negative relation is stronger for 
local SRI funds, local public pension funds, and local dedicated institutions. We also find that the relation 
is more negative in communities that prefer more stringent environmental policies and in communities of 
greater collective cohesiveness. Local institutional ownership, particularly local ownerships by SRI funds 
and public pension funds, is positively related to the probability that an ESG proposal is either introduced 
or withdrawn. The paper sheds light on the drivers behind institutions’ ESG engagement and their 
effectiveness in influencing ESG. 
 
JEL classification: D22; G34; M14 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) conducted its third triennial survey of 1,000 
CEOs across 103 countries. The survey found that 93% of the responding CEOs regarded environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) issues as important to the success of their business, and 69% expected 
investor interest to be an increasingly important factor in building ESG into their core business. Motivated 
by the growing importance of ESG and the strong desire of corporate executives for shareholder input, we 
study the role of institutional investors in influencing corporate ESG. More specifically, we analyze the 
relation between ownership by local institutional investors and the amount of toxic chemicals released into 
the environment by the nearby facility using a sample of 3,907 institutional investors from 1994 to 2010.  
Our study is distinct from other work on ESG1  in two important ways: 1) we focus on the 
environmental aspect of ESG; and 2) the analysis is primarily conducted at the facility, instead of the firm, 
level. Our approach has numerous advantages. By analyzing the impact of institutional investors on toxic 
release, we examine a classic example of negative externalities, which according to the traditional theory 
of the firm, should fall outside the domain of corporate activities. Specifically, institutional investors should 
refrain from considering corporate environmental issues on the ground that they own a fiduciary duty to 
their investors to maximize investment return (Darabaris, 2007). Consistent with this notion, anecdotal 
evidence, including the above-mentioned UNGC surveys, shows that executives have expressed a strong 
desire for greater shareholder involvement in their consideration of corporate environmental policies. 
Second, while there is a rich body of work analyzing the impact of various stakeholders such as regulators, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and consumers on corporate environmental policies, the evidence 
on the role of investors is scarce (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006; Delmas and Toffel, 2012). We feel the urgency 
to fill this literature gap because as the owners of the firm, shareholders are the most influential 
stakeholders.  
                                                            
1 For simplicity, this paper uses ESG, corporate social responsibility (CSR), sustainability, ethical investing, and 
sustainable investing interchangeably (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Gillan, Hartzell, 
Koch, and Starks, 2010). See also the UNGC surveys.  
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Using facility-level data affords us three additional advantages. First, the facility is where pollution 
is generated. Thus, using facility-level data permits us to more directly test the delegated philanthropy 
theory that Bénabou and Tirole (2010) propose to explain the rationales behind the ESG movement. 
Specifically, one important argument “for asking corporations to behave prosocially is that the desired 
actions are often not about transferring income to less-favoured populations, but about refraining from 
specific behaviours, such as polluting the environment” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010, pages 10-11). Second, 
facilities exercise significant decision power over their environmental management, including toxic release 
(Stephan, Kraft, and Abel, 2005), leading to heterogeneous pollution abatement practices across facilities 
within the same firm.2 Thus, using facility-level data enables us to more precisely proxy for the intensity of 
institutional investors’ influence by using their physical distance from the facility. Lastly, as investment 
decisions are made at the sector and firm levels, using facility-level data mitigates endogeneity concerns.   
To more purposefully address our research question—whether institutional investors influence 
facility toxic release—we develop a local influence hypothesis based on the delegated philanthropy theory 
and the transaction-costs arguments (Coase, 1937 and 1960). The delegated philanthropy theory argues that 
as alternative responses to market and government failures, firms act prosocially at the demand of their 
heterogeneous stakeholders (e.g., investors, customers, and employees) because firms incur lower 
information and transaction costs in doing philanthropy than individuals doing these activities on their own. 
Drawing from this theory, the local influence hypothesis argues that heterogeneous preferences for facility 
pollution exist between local and distant institutional investors. Specifically, local institutional investors 
have a greater incentive than their distant counterparts to pressure facilities to reduce pollution because the 
former internalize, to a greater degree, the harm of pollution due to emissions of nearby facilities as well as 
the benefit of social prestige from acting prosocially in a local community. The transaction-costs arguments 
hold that when markets are inefficient, efficient economic transactions can still take place when transaction 
                                                            
2 Also see Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) and “Guide to Successful, Sustainable Social Investment, by the International 
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association,” http://www.ipieca.org/our-work/social/social-
investment/  
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costs (e.g., negotiation costs) are low. Applying this logic, the local influence hypothesis posits that 
compared to their distant peers, local institutional investors face lower negotiation costs and exert a stronger 
influence over local facilities in reducing pollution because they possess a greater amount of soft 
information and tacit knowledge, and have closer social ties with the facility and the local community. 
Consistent with the local influence hypothesis, we find that local institutional investors (measured as 
institutions located within 150 miles of the facility) have a significantly negative effect on toxic release by 
the nearby facility than distant institutional investors, and this result holds in variety of robustness tests.  
To provide further evidence for the local influence hypothesis, we examine the relation between 
local institutional ownership and facility toxic release across institution types. The delegated philanthropy 
theory argues that firms engage in prosocial behaviors because individuals’ preferences are heterogeneous 
and are inevitably not fully reflected in government policies. The literature shows that institutional investors 
have heterogeneous preferences in terms of sacrificing pecuniary rewards for social gains and trading off 
short-term against long-term performance (see, e.g., Aguilera, Williams, Conley, and Rupp, 2006; Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2009; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012). Therefore, the logical extension of the delegated 
philanthropy theory is that to the extent that institutional investors impact facility toxic release, systematic 
differences should exist across different types of local institutional investors in their influence over facility 
toxic release. Consistent with the local preference hypothesis and the existing literature, we find a 
significantly more negative effect for local socially responsible investing (SRI) funds and local public 
pension funds than for other types of local institutional investors. We also find some evidence that 
ownership by local dedicated institutional investors (characterized by a low portfolio turnover rate and more 
concentrated holdings) is more negatively related to facility toxic release than ownership by their transient 
counterparts (characterized by a high portfolio turnover rate and more diversified portfolios). 
We perform two sets of more stringent tests of the local influence hypothesis. Extending the logic 
of the delegated philanthropy theory that firms engage in prosocial behaviors at the demand of 
heterogeneous stakeholders, it is reasonable to expect that local institutional investors engage in ESG on 
behalf of their community. This delegation may occur because as a member of the local community, 
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institutional investors have the means and expertise that individual community members and community 
organizations lack to influence facility behaviors (see, e.g., Bui and Mayer, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007; 
Lee and Lounsbury, 2009). In addition, clients of local institutional investors may reside in the community 
and request the local institutional investors to act on their behalf to pressure the facility to reduce pollution. 
To the extent that a community puts a premium on a better environment, efforts exerted to reduce pollution 
also generate greater image value in that community. Therefore, the local influence hypothesis predicts that 
local institutional ownership is more negatively associated with facility pollution in communities that prefer 
more stringent environmental policies. Drawing from the literature, we use four different proxies to gauge 
this preference of a community and find consistent evidence in support of the local influence hypothesis. 
The other more stringent test of the local influence hypothesis is premised on the transaction-costs 
arguments or to put it more precisely, the recognition that the Coase theorem requires the assumption of 
zero transaction costs. In “large-number” cases (i.e., when a transaction requires the agreement of a large 
number of people), the process of direct negotiation and agreement breaks down because coordination costs 
are so high that people can no longer negotiate their way to efficiency. Following this line of reasoning, the 
local influence hypothesis predicts that local institutional ownership is more negatively associated with 
facility pollution in communities of greater collective cohesiveness (i.e., lower coordination costs). 
Following the literature, we use two empirical proxies to gauge the collective cohesiveness of a community 
and find consistent evidence in support of the local influence hypothesis.  
Lastly, to provide direct evidence for their influence, we study the impact of local institutional 
investors on the likelihood that an ESG shareholder proposal is introduced or withdrawn. A proposal is 
frequently withdrawn after its sponsor reaches a compromise with the firm (Viederman, 2002; Buchanan, 
Netter, Poulsen, and Yang, 2012). Consistent with the overall evidence, we find a positive link between 
local institutional ownership and the probability that a firm receives a proposal targeting social and 
environmental issues or such a proposal is withdrawn. Further, this positive relation is stronger if a firm has 
a higher level of local ownership by SRI funds or public pension funds than if a firm has a higher level of 
local ownership by other types of institutional investors.  
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This paper makes four main contributions. First, the paper contributes to the rapidly growing ESG 
literature. Despite the richness of this literature, evidence on shareholders’ role in ESG, particularly their 
role in influencing corporate environmental policies, is scarce and mixed. Bauer et al. (2013) and Dimson 
et al. (2015) both use proprietary data from a single institutional investor with a major commitment to ESG 
and find that the asset manager actively engages in and improves corporate social and environmental 
policies. Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2015) study whether institutional investors improve a firm’s 
environmental and social scores for a large sample of firms from 41 countries. They find that non-U.S. 
institutional investors’ stock holdings, but not those by U.S. institutional investors, are related to the scores. 
Using a sample of 3,907 U.S. institutional investors, we find that local institutional ownership is 
significantly and negatively related to facility toxic release. Second, we provide evidence for the delegated 
philanthropy theory. To the best of our knowledge, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) is the only study that 
tests the theory, but their evidence focuses on corporate insiders and other stakeholders as opposed to 
shareholders. Third, our results shed light on the slow evolution that the environmental regulation in the 
United States has been undergoing for the past 30 years, moving from command and control strategies 
towards market-based regulations (Bui and Mayer, 2003). This paper identifies one market mechanism—
local institutional investors—that is facilitating the transition. Lastly, this paper contributes to other strands 
of social science literature such as environmental justice, organizational behavior, and public choice that 
analyze the relation between corporate environmental actions and the stakeholders. While each literature 
branch is large, researchers’ attention has been squarely on other stakeholders (e.g., regulators, competitors, 
suppliers, consumers, NGOs, etc.) as opposed to shareholders. This paper provides an important piece of 
missing evidence and helps address open questions in different fields of studies including why different 
firms reduce pollution unevenly (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), how social movement shapes corporate 
behaviors (King and Soule, 2007), and what drives corporations to comply with costly environmental 
regulation when the enforcement role is limited (Sigman and Stafford, 2010). 
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1. Three rationales behind ESG and limited evidence on the delegated philanthropy theory 
The exponential growth in the number of firms engaging in ESG has motivated researchers to 
develop new theories to explain the rationales behind the ESG movement. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) 
synthesize the CSR literature, define CSR as corporate activities that are about sacrificing profits in the 
social interest, and propose a delegated philanthropy theory to augment the well-established shareholder 
value theory and agency theory in explaining the ESG movement. Briefly, shareholder value theory argues 
that firms pursue CSR because such activities enhance shareholder value, while agency theory argues that 
corporate executives use shareholders’ money to pursue CSR for their own benefit. Shareholder value 
theory is similar to the enlightened value maximization theory of Jensen (2001), which posits that firm 
value is maximized in the long run when the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are aligned.  
While ample evidence has been generated for shareholder value theory and agency theory, 3 
evidence on the delegated philanthropy theory is limited. To the best of our knowledge, Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) is the only study that tests the theory. Using firm-level CSR ratings of Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD), they find that firms have higher CSR scores when they have Democratic 
rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic- 
rather than Republican-leaning states. 
   
2.2. Hypothesis development 
To more purposefully investigate the potential role of institutional investors in corporate 
environmental policies, we develop the local influence hypothesis based on the delegated philanthropy 
                                                            
3 For a survey of the literature on the relation between ESG and firm performance, please see Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes (2003), Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007), Van Beurden and Gössling (2008), Renneboog, Horst, and 
Zhang (2008), and Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012). For evidence consistent with Jensen’s enlightened value 
maximization theory, please see Jiao (2010) and Deng, Kang, and Low (2013). Relatedly, a large body of work shows 
that firms pursue ESG to gain a competitive advantage in the product market (see, e.g., Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; 
Flammer, 2015). For evidence on agency theory, please see Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006), Barnea and Rubin 
(2010), Amore and Bennedsen (2016), Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016), and Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill 
(2016).  
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theory and the transaction-costs arguments. The delegated philanthropy theory (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010) 
argues that as alternative responses to market and government failures, firms act prosocially at the demand 
of their heterogeneous stakeholders because firms incur lower information and transaction costs in doing 
philanthropy than individuals doing these activities on their own and through charitable organizations. The 
transaction-costs arguments (Coase, 1937 and 1960) hold that in a world of fully defined property rights 
and zero transaction costs, people can negotiate their way to efficiency when the market outcome is 
inefficient. According to Coase, transaction costs include search and information costs, haggling over the 
terms of the contract, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing the contract. Therefore, the delegated 
philanthropy theory and the transaction-costs arguments are closely related in that information and 
transaction costs play a prominent role in both concepts. Nonetheless, the two conceptual frameworks offer 
distinctive guidance for us in developing our hypothesis; the former highlights the drivers behind the 
heterogeneous preferences within stakeholders, while the latter highlights the drivers behind efficiency in 
transactions, namely in our case why and when local institutional investors are more effective than their 
distant peers in influencing facility pollution. 
Drawing from the delegated philanthropy theory, we argue that two factors explain the 
heterogeneous preferences between local and distant institutional investors—internalization of externalities 
and self-image concerns. The delegated philanthropy theory argues that because preferences are 
heterogeneous, it is inevitable that some stakeholders’ values are not fully reflected in government policies, 
leading those stakeholders to become social activists. Extending this logic, because they are physically 
close to a polluting facility, local institutional investors internalize, to a much greater degree, pollution 
emitted by the facility, leading them to be more willing than distant peers to influence the facility to reduce 
pollution. The delegated philanthropy theory argues that self-image concerns drive prosocial behaviors 
because individuals naturally desire to “not only be loved, but to be lovely” (Smith, 1759). Endeavors to 
reduce local facilities’ pollution should create greater image value to local institutional investors than to 
their distant peers because prosocial actions are more visible in and bring larger immediate benefits to local 
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communities. As Bénabou and Tirole (2010) note, “[g]iving is heavily distorted toward the more visible or 
memorable targets.” 
Drawing from the transaction-costs arguments, we argue that two factors explain why local 
institutional investors are more effective than their distant peers in pressuring local facilities to reduce 
pollution—local information and social ties. Freely available internet-based information like the Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI) data that we use to measure the quantity of toxic chemicals released into the 
environment by a facility has substantially equalized one important advantage of being local—access to 
information. However, we argue that geographic proximity facilitates the accumulation of one specific type 
of information—“local” information, which does not travel well over distance. Specifically, being 
physically close to the facility, local institutional investors can interact more frequently and less costly with 
facility managers and employees through varied means of communication including face-to-face meetings, 
on-site inspections, and local environmental activities like Earth Day and community cleanups. These 
interactions facilitate the collection and processing of soft information and tacit knowledge—hereafter 
referred to as local information for brevity. The literature characterizes soft information as information not 
available in the public domain through standard reports, but acquired by personal observation or through 
personal ties (see, e.g., Argote, McEvily, and Reagans, 2003; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Petersen, 2004); 
and characterizes tacit knowledge as knowledge specific to an institution that is developed internally, 
critical to the long-term survivability of the institution, and often only transmitted through face-to-face 
contact (Coff, Coff, and Eastvold, 2006; Husted, Jamali, and Saffar, 2016). Consistent with this notion, 
case study evidence shows that a facility is more inclined to adopt new pollution abatement measures during 
their negotiations with host communities when the community representatives have a basic understanding 
of the facility’s operation and toxic generation process and can judge the tradeoff of the proposed changes 
(Macey and Susskind, 2003; Allen, Letourneau, and Hebb, 2012). Second, geographic proximity enables 
local institutional investors to develop stronger social ties with facility managers and employees, thereby 
empowering them to exert greater influence than their distant peers. Consistent with this argument, a large 
body of sociological research (see, e.g., Grant, Trautner, and Jones, 2004) finds that local communities 
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provide venues (churches, voluntary associations, barber shops, etc.) for residents to solve mutual problems 
like pollution, and facilities with stronger social ties to their host communities pollute less. 
Anecdotal evidence is also consistent with the idea that local information and social ties play a 
critical role in pollution abatement. For example, despite the fact that the toxic release problem in Mossville, 
Louisiana was well-publicized in the national media (see, e.g., Associated Press, CNN, and the 2002 
documentary film Blue Vinyl),4 the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a coalition of 
nearly 300 institutional investors, partnered with Mossville Environmental Action Now (MEAN), a local 
environmental justice advocacy group, to organize in 2009 a group of investors to travel to the region on a 
fact-finding trip. The group met with local community representatives to assess the environmental and 
health impacts of the toxic release in the area. In 2010, members of the ICCR submitted three shareholder 
proposals to ConocoPhillips and PPG Industries, which operate facilities in Mossville (both firms are in 
our sample). As another example, an SRI fund with an engagement history dating back to the 1970s 
commented that “we don’t often like to engage a company unless we do have some actual contact on the 
ground with local communities” (Goodman, Louche, Van Cranenburgh, and Arenas, 2014, page 201).  
To summarize, building upon the delegated philanthropy theory and the transaction-costs 
arguments, the local influence hypothesis predicts:  
H1: Ownership by local institutional investors is more negatively related to the amount of toxic release by 
nearby facilities than ownership by distant institutional investors. 
 
The null hypothesis is that local institutional ownership is not related to facility toxic release 
because corporate environmental policies fall outside the purview of institutional investors. Consistent with 
this idea, Dyck et al. (2015) find that U.S. institutional investors’ stockholdings are not related to firms’ 
environmental and social ratings. A 2013 Financial Times article also reported that in recent years, many 
firms have “deprioritised” their sustainability ambitions because “there have been more pressing things to 
worry about, [such as] paying the bills.”5 
                                                            
4  “Mossville Delegation Hopes to Speak to U.N. Negotiators,” 31 August 1999, The Associate Press; 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/26/toxic.town.mossville.epa/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Vinyl.  
5 “Profits are the Route to Sustainable Business,” by Andrew Hill, 23 September 2013, Financial Times.  
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Institutional investors are not a homogenous group. Extending the delegated philanthropy theory, 
it stands to reason that systematic differences should exist in the amount of facility toxic release across 
institution types because heterogeneous institutional investors have different preferences in trading off 
pecuniary rewards for social gains or short-term versus long-term performance. Specifically, drawing from 
the literature, we expect that: 1) SRI funds and public pension funds have a stronger preference for ESG 
than other institutional investors; and 2) dedicated, rather than transient, institutional investors have a 
stronger preference for ESG.  
We expect SRI funds to have a strong preference for ESG given their investment mandates based 
on ethical and sustainability beliefs (Bialkowski and Starks, 2016). SRI funds are the vanguard in the ESG 
movement with their roots in screening investment based on religious prohibitions. One of the earliest 
adopters of SRI was John Wesley (1703-1791), a founder of the Methodist Church in England. He outlined 
the guidelines of social investing in his sermon “The Use of Money” as not to harm your neighbor through 
your business practices and to avoid industries like tanning and chemical production, which can harm the 
health of workers. In recent years, with a desire to accelerate change, some SRI funds like Calvert have 
changed from the traditional negative-screen approach—avoiding companies that have a negative social 
and environmental impact—to a best-in-class approach, prodding firms to adopt best ESG practices 
(Bialkowski and Starks, 2016; Graham, Pagano, and Yang, 2018).6 Public pension funds have been activists 
in social investing since the 1970s, when many divested from apartheid South Africa (Munnell and Chen, 
2016). The literature establishes that pension funds (see, e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Dimson et al., 
2015), particularly public pension funds (see, e.g., Rounds, 2005; Wang and Mao, 2015), tend to be ESG 
activists because public pension funds have a strong incentive to pursue politically popular agendas (Del 
Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). As an example, Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) find that 53% shareholder 
proposals filed by public pension funds were social and environmental proposals.  
                                                            
6 “Hydraulic Fracturing Advocacy Yields Wins,” 1 April 2014, gives an example of Calvert using the best-in-class 
approach in affecting firms’ environmental policies, https://www.calvert.com/newsArticle.html?article=21080. 
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Dedicated institutional investors are expected to have a stronger preference for ESG than their 
transient peers, because the former has a longer investment horizon and is therefore more inclined to support 
ESG policies that are long-term oriented (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014). More specifically, in our 
case, it takes time and effort to accumulate soft information and tacit knowledge as well as build social ties 
to be effective in influencing facility toxic release. In addition, investment in pollution abatement 
technologies can be large and typically take years to realize the benefits (e.g., through more efficient 
production and less regulatory penalties). Thus, a longer investment horizon allows dedicated institutional 
investors, who are characterized by a low portfolio turnover rate and more concentrated holdings, to 
maximize the benefits, while minimizing the costs, of exerting influence over facility toxic release. 
Consistent with these arguments, the survey evidence by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) shows that 
long-term institutional investors intervene more intensively than short-term ones. 
To summarize, the local preference hypothesis predicts that the relation between local institutional 
ownership and facility toxic release varies in the following systematic way across institution types:  
H2.a: Ownerships by local SRI and local public pension funds are more negatively related to the amount 
of toxic release by nearby facilities than ownership by other local institutional investors. 
H2.b: Ownership by local dedicated institutional investors is more negatively related to the amount of toxic 
release by nearby facilities than ownership by local transient institutional investors. 
 
Extending the logic of the delegated philanthropy theory that firms engage in prosocial behaviors 
at the demand of heterogeneous stakeholders, it is reasonable to expect that local institutional investors 
engage in ESG on behalf of their community. This delegation may occur because while the local community 
bears substantial externalities associated with a local plant’s pollution, individual community members and 
community organizations, compared to institutional investors, lack the capacity to process complex toxics 
release data (Bui and Mayer, 2003) and the means and expertise to influence facility behaviors (see, e.g., 
Gillan and Starks, 2007; Lee and Lounsbury, 2009). Therefore, as a member of the community, institutional 
investors may become the voice of the community in influencing the local facility’s toxic release. Assuming 
that their clients reside in the community and prefer less pollution, local institutional investors may also act 
on the behalf of their clients to pressure the facility in reducing pollution. To the extent that a local 
12 
 
community puts a premium on a higher-quality environment, efforts exerted in reducing pollution generate 
greater image value in that community. Building upon the preceding rationales, the local influence 
hypothesis predicts that local institutional ownership is more negatively associated with facility toxic 
release in communities that prefer more stringent environmental policies.  
The Coase theorem (1960) holds that externalities can be best resolved by reducing transaction 
costs so that affected parties can enter into mutually satisfactory bargains. However, the process of direct 
negotiation and agreement can no longer deliver efficient outcomes when there are large coordination 
problems. Therefore, the local influence hypothesis predicts that local institutional ownership is more 
negatively associated with facility toxic release in communities of greater collective cohesiveness.  
To summarize, the local preference hypothesis predicts that the relation between local institutional 
ownership and facility toxic release varies in the following systematic way considering a community’s 
characteristics: 
H3.a: Ownership by local institutional investors is more negatively related to facility toxic release in 
communities that prefer more stringent environmental policies. 
H3.b: Ownership by local institutional investors is more negatively related to facility toxic release in 
communities of greater collective cohesiveness. 
 
 
3. Data and sample description  
3.1. Data  
We obtain toxics release data from the TRI, a publicly available dataset compiled by the EPA. The 
TRI contains information on disposal and other releases of over 650 toxic chemicals from more than 50,000 
U.S. industrial facilities (including facilities owned by privately held companies) that have reported at least 
once since the TRI was launched in 1986. “Since its first release in 1989, the TRI data have become the 
primary measure of a plant’s environmental performance” (Prechel and Zheng, 2012, page 958). Because 
“TRI is the best source of data nationwide on toxic release to the environment” (Natan and Miller, 1998, 
page 368), numerous research papers have used the TRI data to study corporate CSR activities and 
performance (see, e.g., Dooley and Lerner, 1994; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000; King and Lenox, 
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2000 and 2002). In Appendix I, we provide more details for the TRI including data limitations and how our 
measure of toxic release compares to the more commonly used measure of corporate CSR performance—
the KLD ratings.    
We merge the TRI data with the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) Database to obtain 
facility size, with the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database to retrieve financial and stock price information, 
and with the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database to obtain institutional ownership. 
After meeting the necessary data requirement, the final sample consists of 770 unique firms, 5,049 unique 
facilities, 3,907 unique institutional investors, or 38,483 facility-year observations from 1994 to 2010. 
To compute distance, we obtain the zip codes of facility locations from the TRI database and the 
zip codes of institution locations mainly from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar 
website, supplemented with the websites of institutional managers. We collect the latitude and longitude of 
the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database. Following prior 
research (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), we calculate the distance (dist) between institution h and 
facility i as follows:  
       
           







ihiihh
iihh
hi
latlatlonlatlonlat
lonlatlonlat
rdist
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,
                          (1) 
where disthi is the distance in statute miles, r denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 3,963 statute 
miles), and lat and lon are the latitude and longitude (measured in radians) of institution and facility 
locations, respectively. 
 
3.2. Sample description 
The EPA requires facilities from the manufacturing sector to report TRI data; the requirement was 
expanded to include seven additional sectors in 1998 (see Appendix I for details). As a result, our sample 
contains 234 unique four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The top five industries 
(15.9% of the total facility-year observations) are 3312 (Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, and Rolling Mills), 
2911 (Petroleum Refining), 3714 (Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories), 3490 (Miscellaneous Fabricated 
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Metal Products), and 2011 (Meat Packing Plants). While the TRI data do not cover all the economic sectors, 
the manufacturing sector is an extremely important sector in an economy (Rynn, 2011). Many studies (see, 
e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Alcácer and Chung, 2007; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2008) 
have used only manufacturing firms in their analyses. Additionally, the eight sectors covered by the TRI 
likely face the most salient environmental issues,7 making them the ideal testing ground for addressing our 
research question, which is the influence of institutional investors on corporate environmental policies. 
The average sample facility has 331 employees (median=166). For the TRI universe, a facility with 
more than 100 employees is considered large (Hanna, 2010; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013). The EPA 
requires facilities with more than 10 full-time employees to report TRI data.8 The greater representation of 
larger facilities in our sample results from the data requirement of merging multiple databases. One 
advantage of having larger facilities in the sample is that small facilities commit more reporting errors due 
to a lack of resources (Grant and Jones, 2003). To the extent that smaller facilities tend to be locally based 
and their pollution abatement policies are more responsive to local community demand (Kassinis and 
Vafeas, 2006; Lee and Lounsbury, 2009), this sample characteristic should bias us against finding a 
negative relation between local institutional ownership and facility toxic release. 
The average sample firm has 6.7 facilities, generated $4.7 billion in net sales in 2010, and has data 
coverage in Compustat for about 26 years. The mean total institutional ownership is 56.4%, which is 
consistent with the findings in existing studies (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003). The mean ownership of 
institutional investors located within 150 miles of a facility is 3.0%, which is in line with the existing 
literature. For example, Ayer, Ramalingegowda, and Yeung (2011) report a mean local monitoring 
institutional ownership of 1.4%. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in regressions 
for the full sample. 
 
                                                            
7  Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000). Also see https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/2013-tri-
national-analysis-comparing-industry-sectors.  
8 The EPA allows for voluntary reporting under EPCRA §313 if a facility does not meet all three threshold criteria but 
would still like to submit a TRI report.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Impact of local institutional ownership on facility toxic release 
4.1.1. Baseline results 
We estimate the following baseline model to test the local influence hypothesis: 
TRij,t = α + γlocalownij,t-1 + β1facility_sizeij,t-1 + β2facility_HQ_distanceij,t-1 + β3REG_stringencyk,t-1  
+ FIRM + MSA + FIRM*YEAR + MSA*YEAR + εij,t,                                                                                             (2) 
 
TRij,t denotes the natural logarithm of one plus the total quantity of toxic chemicals in pounds released into 
the environment by a facility i of a firm j in a given year t. Localown is our main independent variable of 
interest, denoting the stock ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the facility. 
Facility_size is the natural logarithm of the number of employees at the facility. Larger facilities produce 
more and are therefore expected to release a larger quantity of toxic chemicals. Facility_HQ_distance is 
the natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the facility and the firm’s headquarters. We include 
this variable to control for the potential effect of corporate headquarters’ policies on facilities’ toxic release 
decision. Pollution abatement processes are chemical and production-specific and therefore the decision 
control over toxic emission and abatement typically resides with the facility. However, arguments can be 
made that corporate headquarters play a role in influencing facility toxic release. Specifically, Stephan, 
Kraft, and Abel (2005) surveyed 1,083 randomly selected facilities (238 facilities responded; the average 
number of employees per the responding facility in their final sample was 311 with a standard deviation of 
714). One survey question was: “How would you characterize your relationship to your corporate 
headquarters, when it comes to environmental management decisions such as reducing toxic chemical 
releases?” Of the facilities that responded to the question, 31.1% stated that “[t]he facility has almost 
complete control over decision-making,” 31.5% stated that “[t]his location is the corporate office,” and 
20.6% stated that “[d]ecisions are shared equally between the corporate office and the facility.” 
Additionally, Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009) find that divisions closer to corporate headquarters are less 
likely to face layoffs and this relation is stronger for industries with more soft information and when the 
manager is more visible in the community. Landier et al.’s results suggest that the distance between the 
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facility and the corporate headquarters may matter in our investigation for potential reasons including: 1) 
more proximate facilities have easier access to corporate resources to implement pollution control 
technologies; and 2) the top executives have a greater incentive to reduce pollution of nearby facilities due 
to image concerns. We obtain data on headquarters locations for the period of 1994–2006 from Compact 
Disclosure and for the period of 2007–2010 from the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database. 
REG_stringencyk,t-1 is the inverse of the natural logarithm of the total amount of toxic release divided by 
the total number of employees in four main polluting industries: chemicals, petroleum, pulp and paper, and 
materials processing for a state k in year t-1. Following Meyer (1995) and King and Lenox (2001), we use 
this variable to control for the stringency of a state’s environmental regulation. εij,t is the error term. 
In the baseline model, we include firm FE (FIRM), MSA FE (MSA), the interaction of FIRM and 
year dummies (YEAR), and the interaction of MSA and YEAR to control for latent factors such as firm and 
location characteristics. An MSA is a geographical region with a relatively high population density at its 
core and close economic ties throughout the area. MSAs are defined by the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget. We use 2003 U.S. Census Bureau data to obtain the MSA data. In that year, America had 370 
MSAs; in our sample, the facilities are dispersed over 316 MSAs. The MSA classification is only available 
for urban areas. About one-third of our facility-year observations belongs to a rural area. We create a 
separate rural dummy to capture those observations. For ease of presentation, we refer to these 317 region 
dummies as MSA FE (316 MSAs plus one rural dummy).9 Each specification is estimated using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method with robust standard errors accounting for heteroskedasticity and firm-
level clustering. Firm-level clustering is used because facilities are nested within firms. (If facility-level 
clustering is used instead of firm-level clustering, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of localown 
stays the same, but the t-statistic increases (e.g., for column (1) of Table 2, the value increases to 3.57).)  
                                                            
9 In untabulated analyses, we performed two robustness tests. In the first test, we assign a rural area the designation of 
the MSA that is closest to the rural area. In this case, we have 316 geographical-unit dummies. In the second test, we 
follow Giroud (2013) and classify a rural area in each state as a separate region. In this case, we have 363 geographical-
unit dummies (316 MSA dummies plus 47 rural area dummies). Our results hold in both tests. 
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Table 2 presents the regression results of the baseline model. As column (1) shows, localown is 
significantly and negatively related to the amount of total release of the facility—an increase of one 
percentage point in localown leads to a reduction of 4.69% in the total quantity of toxic chemicals released 
into the environment. In untabulated results, we use alternative measures of local institutional ownership 
by measuring the distance between the facility and institutional investors as within 50 miles, 100 miles, and 
250 miles; our results remain qualitatively the same. For further robustness, we also run the baseline 
regression using a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if there is an institutional investor located 
within 150 miles of the facility. Our results hold using this alternative specification.  
For a richer understanding of the relation between localown and facility toxic release, we run the 
baseline regression separately for on-site and off-site releases. Facilities can either choose to treat toxic 
chemicals on-site or transfer them off-site to be treated at specialized waste management facilities. If 
proximity indeed matters, we should find a stronger coefficient estimate for localown in the on-site 
regression than in the off-site regression. Consistent with our expectation, localown is significantly and 
negatively related to the amount of on-site release, but is insignificant in the off-site regression. This pattern 
persists in all of our other results. While we believe that this pattern corroborates the local preference 
hypothesis, we focus on the results of total toxic release because it facilitates an easier and more tractable 
interpretation and presentation of the results.  
Consistent with our expectation and the prior literature (see, e.g., Grant and Jones, 2003), 
facility_size is significantly and positively related to toxic release, while REG_stringency carries a 
significantly negative sign. Facility_HQ_distance enters the regressions of total and on-site releases with a 
significantly negative sign, suggesting that when a facility is located farther away from the corporate 
headquarters, it releases a lower quantity of pollution into the environment. Assuming that the pollution 
amount correlates with production levels,10 this result is consistent with the idea that firms tend to locate 
                                                            
10 The result of a simple correlation test is consistent with this conjecture: the correlation coefficient is -0.105 with a 
one percent significance between facility_HQ_distance and facility_size. 
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headquarters close to production to minimize communication and coordination costs (Henderson and Ono, 
2008).  
To summarize, Table 2 provides strong initial evidence in support of H1–the local preference 
hypothesis. 
 
4.1.2. Endogeneity checks  
We interpret the results in Table 2 as evidence consistent with the local preference hypothesis that 
local institutional investors influence nearby facilities’ pollution abatement policies. An alternative 
explanation could be that firms’ ESG practices influence investors’ decisions. For example, institutional 
investors systematically filter out polluting facilities when forming investment portfolios.11 It could also be 
that some latent variables which drive local institutional ownership also drive facility toxic release. In the 
baseline model, we have taken various steps to mitigate these endogeneity concerns including lagging 
independent variables by one year and controlling for FIRM FE, MSA FE, FIRM*YEAR FE, and 
MSA*YEAR FE. For robustness, we conduct four additional endogeneity checks. 
 
Subsample analyses 
In the first analysis, we sort the sample each year into three groups based on KLD’s rating of a 
firm’s CSR performance. (KLD’s CSR score is a composite measure of social, environmental, and 
governance performance.) If our results are driven by institutional investors systemically screening out 
firms with polluting facilities instead of exerting influence on facilities to reduce pollution, then we should 
expect localown to have a larger negative coefficient in the subsample with high CSR scores than in the 
subsample with low CSR scores. As columns (1)-(2) in Table 3 show, localown is negatively related to total 
                                                            
11 We believe that it is still meaningful if investors make investment decisions based on corporate environmental 
policies even if they do not directly influence the policies because investors’ demand for a firm’s stock impacts the 
cost of capital, which should ultimately impact firm behavior (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Chava, 
2014).  
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toxic release with similarly sized coefficients across the subsamples with high and low CSR scores. We 
find similar results when we sort the sample based on KLD’s rating of a firm’s environmental performance.  
 
Quasi-natural experiment due to institutional investor mergers  
For our second endogeneity check, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment of institutional investor 
mergers in a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. We identify those facilities as the treatment group 
if one of their local institutional investors was acquired by a distant institutional investor and thereby 
experienced an external shock that decreased their localown. The control group consists of those facilities 
that were owned by the same parent company but did not experience any change in the composition of their 
local institutional investors. By comparing the amount of toxic chemicals emitted by the treatment and 
control facilities that share the same parent company around the merger event, this identification strategy 
allows us to better control for the latent firm characteristics that drive institutional investors’ investment 
decisions. Since the merger events concerned investment decisions made by distant institutional investors, 
the events were likely independent of the treatment facilities but directly impacted the dynamics of those 
facilities’ local institutional investors. Therefore, institutional investor mergers serve as a useful quasi-
natural experiment in our effort to provide a portfolio of evidence for the local preference hypothesis. 
We estimate the following DID equation first for the full sample period and then for the subsample 
of facility-year observations five years before and five years after the merger event. We follow the method 
used in Huang (2016) and He and Huang (2016) in identifying institutional investor mergers. Specifically, 
we require that: 1) the merger was completed within one year after the initial announcement; 2) the target 
local institutional investor stopped filing 13F forms within 18 months after the completion of the deal; and 
3) the target local institutional investor held the stock of the parent company in its portfolio prior to the 
merger. After applying these filters, we identified 28 mergers from 1995 to 2008 for our sample. 
TRij,t = α + γ1Treatment*Post + γ2Treatment + β1facility_sizeij,t-1 + β2facility_HQ_distanceij,t-1 + 
β3REG_stringencyk,t-1 + FIRM + MSA + FIRM*YEAR + MSA*YEAR + εij,t,                                          (3) 
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TRij,t denotes the natural logarithm of one plus the total quantity of toxic chemicals released into the 
environment by a facility i of a firm j in a given year t. Treatment is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the facility is in the treatment group and zero if in the control group. Post is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the sample year is after the merger and zero if before the merger. FIRM, MSA, and 
YEAR denote firm, MSA, and year dummies, respectively. Equation 3 does not include the primary effect 
of Post, because it is absorbed by FIRM*YEAR. The local preference hypothesis predicts γ1>0. As columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 4 show, consistent with the prediction of the local preference hypothesis, 
Treatment*Post carries a significantly positive sign, suggesting that toxic release is higher for the treatment 
facilities whose local institutional investors were acquired by distant institutional investors than for the 
control facilities that did not experience any merger event. 
 
Quasi-natural experiment due to facility relocation 
In our third endogeneity check, we follow the DID method used in Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 
(2015). We identify facilities that relocated during our sample period. This event serves as a quasi-natural 
experiment because a facility’s relocation decision is likely independent of institutional investors’ 
investment decisions and will cause local institutional ownership to change for that facility. We obtain 
facility relocation data from NETS. In our full sample of 5,049 facilities (or 38,483 facility-year 
observations), 4,739 facilities never relocated during our sample period of 1994–2010. Excluding those 
facilities results in 310 facilities, or 1,938 facility-year observations. To avoid confounding events, we 
exclude 43 facilities (261 facility-year observations) that relocated more than once during our sample 
period. To ensure that relocation caused a meaningful change in local institutional ownership (e.g., 
eliminate cases where facilities relocated to a nearby building), we verify that post-relocation, there is a 
change in the composition of local institutional investors. This screen eliminates 143 facilities, or 849 
facility-year observations. Lastly, to conduct the DID estimation, we exclude the observations from the 
event year and require facilities to have at least one year of the requisite data before and after the relocation 
event, which further eliminates 48 facilities or 72 facility-year observations. The final relocation sample 
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consists of 76 facilities, or 756 facility-year observations with 253 from the pre-relocation period and 503 
from the post-relocation period. 
To purge the potential endogeneity in localown, we estimate the following DID equation:  
TRij,t = α + β1*Post*localown_increase_dummyij,t + β2*localown_increase_dummyij,t + β3*Post + X + 
FIRM  + YEAR + MSA + εij,t,                                                                                                                                                             (4) 
 
TRij,t is the natural logarithm of one plus the total quantity of toxic chemicals released into the environment 
by a facility i of a firm j in a given year t. Post is an indicator variable that equals one if the facility-year 
observation falls into the post-relocation period and zero if the pre-relocation period. Localown_increase 
is a dummy that equals one if local institutional ownership is higher in the post-relocation period than in 
the pre-relocation period. X indicates the vector of controls for facility and firm characteristics. We use 
time-varying firm characteristics instead of FIRM*YEAR FE because of the small sample size. FIRM, 
YEAR, and MSA denote firm, year, and MSA dummies, respectively. The local preference hypothesis 
predicts β1<0. As column (1) of Table 5 shows, this is indeed our finding: localown_increase_dummy* post 
is significantly and negatively related to facility toxic release, which is consistent with the prediction of the 
local preference hypothesis that after moving to a location with a higher level of local institutional 
ownership, a facility emitted a smaller quantity of toxic chemicals into the environment. 
 
Change-on-change analysis 
The change-on-change analysis is a popular test that empiricists use to study causal relations (see, 
e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 2011; Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi, 2012). 
Specifically in our case, if institutional investors indeed influence facility pollution abatement practices, 
changes in localown should lead to changes in the amount of toxic release by facilities, whereas the reverse 
causation is absent (i.e., changes in facility toxic release do not cause changes in localown). Because 
institutional investors likely have a differential impact on facilities that increase toxic release versus 
facilities that decrease toxic release, we perform the analysis separately for these two groups of facilities. 
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Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression results of changes in the amount of toxic release on lagged 
changes in local institutional ownership. Similar to Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Chhaochharia et al. (2012), 
we include lagged levels of toxic release to account for the mechanical relation that existing levels of toxic 
release affect the extent of future changes. Consistent with the expectation, changes in local institutional 
ownership from year t-2 to t-1 (∆localownt-1) is significantly and negatively related to changes in the amount 
of toxic release from year t-1 to t (∆total toxic releaset) for the subsample of facilities that increased toxic 
release. Consistent with the idea that institutional investors may less intensively monitor those facilities that 
decrease toxic release as opposed to those facilities that increase toxic release, no significant relation exists 
between changes in local institutional ownership in year t-1 and changes in the amount of toxic release in 
year t. Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results of changes in local institutional ownership on lagged 
changes in the amount of toxic release. We find no evidence that changes in the amount of toxic release 
from year t-2 to t-1 lead to changes in local institutional ownership from year t-1 to t. Coefficient estimates 
of all lagged change variables for toxic release are nil and statistically insignificant. 
We acknowledge that despite our efforts, we cannot eradicate the concern of endogeneity because 
we lack a truly exogenous event or an instrument to design our tests. For example, while the quasi-
experiment of institutional investor mergers identifies an event that externally caused local institutional 
ownership to change, it is possible that the merger decisions made by distant institutional investors 
correlated with latent factors that drove both local institutional ownership and facility toxic release. 
Therefore, throughout the paper, we make our inferences based on the statistical association between local 
institutional ownership and facility toxic release rather than a causal-effect interpretation.  
 
4.1.3. Additional robustness checks 
Alternative measures of toxic release 
While our measure of the amount of toxic release is consistent with the existing literature, we 
compute two alternative measures for robustness: residual release and weighted release.  
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The amount of toxic release is a function of both the nature of a firm’s business and its efforts in 
reducing pollution. Simply put, it is unreasonable to expect a grocery store to emit similar quantities of 
toxic release as a paper and pulp facility. Although the inclusion of firm fixed effects mitigates this concern, 
it is instructive to examine whether local institutional investors have any effect on firms’ efforts to reduce 
toxic release given the nature of the business. To proxy a firm’s pollution abatement efforts, we follow 
King and Lenox (2002) and calculate residual release, which is the amount of total toxic release minus the 
predicted amount of toxic release (predicted release). We estimate the following model to obtain predicted 
release: 
TRit= αmt + β1mtfacility_sizei,t-1 + β2mt(facility_sizei,t-1)2 + εit ,                                                                                                                (5)    
TRit denotes the natural logarithm of one plus the total quantity of toxic chemicals released into the 
environment by a facility i in industry m in year t; facility_size is the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees at the facility; and εit is the error term. For model stability, we require regressions to have at least 
20 observations, reducing the sample size from 38,483 to 31,428 facility-year observations. We use the 
estimated coefficients, mtˆ , mt1ˆ , and mt2ˆ , to obtain predicted release for each facility based on its size, 
three-digit SIC industry, and year. Column (1) of Appendix III reports the results of the baseline model 
when we use residual release as the dependent variable. Consistent with our earlier findings, local 
institutional ownership is significantly and negatively related to residual release. We find it reassuring that 
REG_stringency retains the significantly negative sign, but facility_size and facility_HQ distance are no 
longer significant.  
As the toxicity of each chemical varies, we follow King and Lenox (2000) and calculate the 
weighted sum of toxic release by weighing each chemical by the inverse of its Reportable Quantity (RQ). 
The EPA developed substance-specific RQ, requiring immediate reporting to authorities should a listed 
substance be released into the environment in an amount beyond its RQ. For example, for highly toxic 
chemicals like arsenic, the RQ is one pound, while relatively benign chemicals like methanol have an RQ 
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of 5,000 pounds.12 Therefore, RQ proxies for the toxicity or the environmental harm of each chemical. As 
column 2 of Appendix III shows, our results hold using this alternative measure of toxic release. 
 
Other tests  
Column (3) of Appendix III reports the baseline regression after we add the additional control of 
localown_HQ, which is the ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the corporate 
headquarters. We perform this robustness check to control for the possibility that institutional investors 
influence facility toxic release via the channel of corporate headquarters. More specifically, corporate 
headquarters have the ultimate authority to allocate the necessary resources to facilities to implement 
pollution abatement policies. In this light, the closer institutional investors are to the corporate headquarters, 
the potentially easier it is for them to access the top executives of the firm and push for desired corporate-
wide policies. To give a piece of anecdotal evidence, between 1993 and 2011, ICCR members addressed 
35 social, environmental, and governance issues with Walmart through shareholder resolutions and/or 
dialogues. In 2005, an ICCR member, the Northwest Coalition for Responsible Investment (NWCRI), 
formed a dialogue team to meet with Walmart at its headquarters each quarter concerning its social issues. 
In July 2010, they met with Walmart’s CEO along with a dozen other executives for a day. These visits are 
easier to complete if institutional investors are proximate to the headquarters.13 As column (3) of Appendix 
III shows, localown_HQ is insignificant, while localown continues to be significantly negative (p-
value<0.01). For additional robustness (results not tabulated to conserve space), we exclude the 
observations (7,952) where facilities are located within 150 miles of the headquarters to better purge the 
headquarters effect. Under this specification, the coefficient estimate of localown is -6.972 with a 1% 
significance, while localown_HQ continues to be insignificant. 
                                                            
12  We collect the RQ data for each chemical from the website of the U.S. Department of Energy 
(http://homer.ornl.gov/rq/index.cfm). 
13 http://www.ipjc.org/programs/11NWCRIAnnualReportWeb.pdf.  
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To control for the possibility that EPA offices are heterogeneous in their intensity in enforcing 
environmental regulations and the heterogeneities correlate with localown, we conduct several robustness 
checks. Specifically, the EPA has three headquarters and ten regional offices across the country. 
Headquarters hosts a multitude of program offices, some of which provide essential functional support for 
the EPA such as human resource management and technology services, while others develop goals, policies 
and guidelines, perform oversight, and provide assistance for the regional offices. Regional offices are 
responsible for implementing EPA programs within their states and in some cases, territories. In the first 
robustness check, we use the location of the three EPA headquarters and ten regional offices to create a 
dummy variable, EPA_dummy, which takes the value of one if the zip code of any of the three EPA 
headquarters and ten regional offices is within 150 miles of the facility and zero otherwise. As column (4) 
of Appendix III shows, our results hold after we include EPA_dummy in the baseline regression. In the 
second robustness check, we include in the baseline regression EPA fixed effects based on the location of 
the ten EPA regional offices. We do not control for the fixed effects of the three EPA headquarters because 
their territories cover the entire country. In the third robustness check, we include in the baseline model the 
EPA fixed effects (FE) and EPA*YEAR FE. Our results hold in these robustness tests. (Results are not 
tabulated to conserve space.) 
In the baseline regression, we use FIRM FE and FIRM*YEAR FE to control for time-varying firm 
characteristics. For more robustness, we follow the literature (see, e.g., Arora and Cason, 1995; Dimson et 
al., 2015; Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013), 
explicitly controlling for firm characteristics that potentially impact facility toxic release. As column (5) of 
Appendix III shows, our result holds in this check. 
In another robustness check, we obtain effluent violation data from the Integrated Compliance 
Information System-National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ICIS-NPDES) database. The 
motivation behind this test is to use a different database other than the TRI data and deploy a different 
measure of facility environmental performance other than emission quantity to test the impact of local 
institutional investors. While the ICIS-NPDES was created in 1972 by the Clean Water Act and therefore 
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provides a long time series dating back to 1974, the database only covers water violations. Consequently, 
after merging the ICIS-NPDES data with our sample, we only have 4,433 facility-year observations left.14 
Column (6) of Appendix III reports the baseline model when the dependent variable is the logarithm of one 
plus the number of effluent violations. Consistent with our overall results, localown is significantly and 
negatively related to the frequency that a facility commits effluent violations. 
In untabulated analysis (to conserve space), we investigate whether our results are sensitive to 
changes in the TRI data, including the 1998 addition of seven additional sectors, chemical additions, 
changes to chemical reporting thresholds, and changes in reporting forms. Our results are not sensitive to 
these changes. To mitigate the concern of reporting errors in the TRI data, we also run the baseline 
regression for only core chemicals. Core chemical groups exclude any chemicals that were added to or 
removed from the TRI list during our sample period. The idea is that using core chemical groups ensures 
that there were consistent reporting requirements for chemicals in the analysis across all reporting years. In 
addition, routine inspections and audits should work more effectively in ensuring accurate reporting for the 
core chemical groups. Our results hold in this robustness check. In another robustness check, we exclude 
electric utilities from our analysis. This test is to mitigate the concern that electric utilities are special 
because they face a higher level of regulation than other industries and they tend to be large emitters. In the 
raw TRI database, the industry sector of Electric Utilities accounted for 5.33% of the total observations. 
After meeting requisite data requirements, the number of the observations from Electric Utilities in our 
sample is less than 100. Our results hold after excluding these observations from the sector of Electric 
Utilities. Although the baseline regression controls for the stringency of state environmental regulation, for 
more robustness, we re-run the baseline model excluding facilities located in California and New York as 
their environmental regulations are quite different from other states.15 Our results also hold using this 
alternative specification. 
                                                            
14 In this light, the ICIS-NPDES is similar to other databases such as the National Emissions Inventory (NEI) and the 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database in that they pale in comparison to the TRI in terms of 
the breath, length, and reliability of facility-level environmental performance data.  
15 http://www.stpub.com/environmental-state-differences-summaries-and-checklists-online.  
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4.2. Impact of local institutional investors by institution type 
Table 7 reports the regression results from testing H2. H2.a predicts that ownerships by local SRI 
and local public pension funds are more negatively related to the amount of toxic release from nearby 
facilities than ownership by other local institutional investors. H2.b predicts that ownership by local 
dedicated institutional investors is more negatively related to facility toxic release than ownership by local 
transient institutional investors. We run separate regressions for each institution type for ease of illustration 
as well as to avoid multicollinearity.16 We use data from SocialFunds to identify SRI funds (Edmans, 2011). 
We obtain the classification of dedicated versus transient institutional investors as well as data on public 
pension funds from Bushee’s website. 17 We obtain hedge fund manager information from the Lipper/TASS 
hedge fund databases. We match each hedge fund by name with the Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13F) Database. Our matching process follows the approach of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004).  
As Panel A of Table 7 shows, we find strong evidence in support of H2.a. Ownerships by local SRI 
funds (localown_SRI) and local public pension funds (localown_Public pension fund) are significantly and 
negatively related to the amount of facility toxic release. Further, coefficient equity tests reject the null that 
their coefficient estimates equal that of ownership by other types of institutional investors 
(localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund). These results are consistent with the existing literature that some 
SRI funds and public pension funds have taken an active-ownership strategy in recent years, actively 
engaging corporations to adopt environmental and social initiatives (see, e.g., Rounds, 2005; Bauer et al., 
2013; Dimson et al., 2015). For a more complete picture, we also compute ownership by local hedge funds 
and regress facility toxic release on this variable (localown_Hedge fund). Compared to other types of 
institutional investors like SRI funds and pension funds, hedge funds tend to have a shorter investment 
                                                            
16  For example, the correlation between localown_SRI and localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund is 0.374 (p-
value<0.001), between localown_Public pension fund and localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund is 0.251 (p-
value<0.001), between localown_Hedge fund and localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund is 0.493 (p-value<0.001), and 
between localown_DED and localown_TRA is 0.464 (p-value<0.001). 
17 http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIvars.html.  
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horizon (Bratton and Wachter, 2010) and are less constrained by social norms in making investment 
decisions (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). In addition, compared to other asset managers like those employed 
at SRI funds and pension funds, hedge fund managers have strong incentives to pursue top investment 
returns because of their pay structure (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). These characteristics of 
hedge funds suggest that they may exert less influence on a facility’s toxic release practices because the 
link between corporate environmental policies and firm value is unclear (Grewal, Serafeim, and Yoon, 
2016). As column (4) shows, the coefficient estimate of localown_Hedge fund is smaller in magnitude 
compared to that of localown_SRI and localown_Public pension fund and is statistically insignificant. This 
pattern complements Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), which finds that sin stocks have higher expected returns 
than otherwise comparable stocks and are less held by norm-constrained institutions such as pension plans 
as compared to natural arbitrageurs such as hedge funds.  
As Panel B of Table 7 shows, we have weak evidence in support of H2.b. Consistent with H2.b, 
ownership by dedicated local institutional investors (localown_DED) is significantly and negatively related 
to toxic release, while ownership by transient local institutional investors (localown_TRA) is insignificant. 
However, the coefficient equity test fails to reject the null that the coefficient estimates of localown_DED 
and localown_TRA are equal.  
 
4.3. Does the impact of local institutional investors vary with community characteristics? 
Table 8 reports the regression results from testing H3.a, which predicts that ownership by local 
institutional investors is more negatively related to facility toxic release in communities that prefer stricter 
environmental policies. To proxy for this community characteristic, we use four proxies—the ratio of 
Democratic over Republican voters, the ratio of religious adherents, the ratio of people above age 65 or less 
than age 18, and the ratio of the female population. The literature (see, e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; 
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014) shows that that Democratic-leaning rather than Republican-leaning people 
are more inclined to support social and environmental causes. Given the prominent role of faith in social 
investing, we expect communities with a larger number of religious adherents to have a stronger preference 
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for stricter environmental policies (see, e.g., Perez and Soydemir, 2010; Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and 
Ter Horst, 2015). Elderly people and children are more vulnerable to pollution than the general population 
(see, e.g., Kahn, 2002; Beder, 2013). Prior work shows that females often play a championship role in 
promoting environmental causes (Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1991; Bear, Rahman, and Post, 2013). Velte 
(2016) also finds that female leadership is positively related to firms’ ESG performance. Following the 
literature (see, e.g., Earnhart, 2004; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006), we use county-level data to capture a 
community’s characteristics. The ratio of Democratic to Republican voters is the ratio of county-level votes 
for the Democratic presidential candidate to those for the Republican presidential candidate during the 
presidential election each four years. We collect the voting data from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential 
Elections (http://uselectionatlas.org). The ratio of religious adherents is a county-level adjusted rate of 
religious adherents per 1000 population in 2000 (Finke and Scheitle, 2005). We obtain the adherence data 
from the Association of Religion Data Archive. Since the data is collected every decade, we use the 2000 
data as 2000 falls in the middle of our sample period (1994–2010). We obtain annual county-level data on 
age and gender from http://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html. To discriminate between 
communities that prefer more stringent environmental policies, we sort the sample into terciles based on 
the value of the four empirical proxies. H3.a predicts that localown is more negative for the subsample in 
the top tercile of the four ratios. As Table 8 shows, we find some evidence in support of H3.a. Specifically, 
while localown consistently enters all the regressions with a negative sign, it is only statistically significant 
in the regressions for communities that prefer more stringent environmental policies. However, the 
coefficient equality test fails to reject the null that the coefficient estimates of localown are the same across 
subsamples with high and low values of the ratio of Democratic to Republican voters, the ratio of religious 
adherents, and the ratio of the female population; and it rejects the null with marginal significance for the 
ratio of people older than age 65 or younger than age 18.  
Table 9 reports the regression results from testing H3.b, which predicts that ownership by local 
institutional investors is more negatively related to facility toxic release in communities of greater collective 
cohesiveness. Following the literature (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1993; Derezinski, Lacy, and Stretesky, 2003; 
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Grant, Trautner, Downey, and Thiebaud, 2010), we employ two empirical proxies to gauge the collective 
cohesiveness in a community: county-level voter turnout rates and the ratio of Caucasians over the total 
population. The voter turnout rate is the total votes cast in a county in a general election over the total 
population in the county, collected from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections 
(http://uselectionatlas.org). The annual data on the Caucasian population come from 
http://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html. Similarly to testing H3.a, we sort the sample 
into terciles based on the value of the two ratios to discriminate between communities that have a greater 
versus a lesser collective cohesiveness. H3.b predicts that localown is more negative for the sample ranked 
in the top tercile based on the empirical proxies (i.e., high values of voter turnout rates or the ratio of the 
Caucasian population). We find reasonably strong evidence in support of H3.b. Localown consistently 
enters all the regressions with a negative sign and is only statistically significant in the regressions for 
communities that have a higher degree of collective cohesiveness. Further, for both proxies, the coefficient 
equality test rejects the null that the coefficient estimates of localown are the same across the subsamples 
of communities with greater versus lower collective cohesiveness.  
We acknowledge that our proxies for community characteristics are subject to the usual caveats of 
empirical proxies. As traits of communities are interdependent, different empirical proxies may capture the 
same community characteristic, or one empirical proxy may capture multiple community characteristics. 
For example, Republican voters tend to be more religious; the Caucasian ratio can correlate with income 
and education levels. Nonetheless, we believe that these two additional tests are useful in helping us gain a 
richer understanding of institutional investors’ role in shaping environmental policies. 
 
4.4. Evidence from shareholder proposals 
While engagement by institutional investors with their portfolio companies can take many forms 
including letter writing, phone calls, meetings, proxy actions, and selling shares, most of these engagement 
actions are done behind-the-scenes and thus are unobservable to an outsider and difficult to acquire for a 
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broad sample of firms.18 One reason behind the preference for the behind-the-scenes engagement is that it 
is more effective in instigating change than the more public forms such as publicly criticizing a firm or 
taking legal action. This rationale is consistent with the survey evidence in McCahery et al. (2016) and the 
theoretical model by Levit (2014) who shows that if an activist’s information becomes public, the activist 
loses credibility and the ability to influence the manager’s actions. Additionally, this tactic appears to have 
been gaining popularity in recent years. For example, since 1987, the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) has published an annual focus list of poorly performing companies with the 
goal to, through public pressure, engage firms and ultimately realize better stock performance. In 2010, 
CalPERS abandoned the “name-and-shame” approach in favor of private negotiations because the latter is 
more effective in engaging firms and effecting desired changes.  
In this section, we analyze shareholder proposals—one of the few observable engagement 
activities—to provide evidence for the channel of shareholder engagement. Specifically, we study the 
impact of local institutional investors on the likelihood that a firm receives an ESG proposal and the 
likelihood that an ESG proposal is withdrawn. A proposal is frequently withdrawn because the proposal 
sponsor has reached an agreement with the firm (Viederman, 2000; Buchanan et al., 2012). For this analysis, 
we merge our sample with Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) Shareholder Proposal Database from 
the WRDS platform. A proposal is classified as an ESG proposal if ISS designates the proposal Resolution 
Type “Socially Responsible Initiative (SRI)” and zero otherwise. Examples of ESG proposals include 
reports on political donations and policy and reports on financial risks related to climate change. The 
shareholder proposal data are available from 1997 onward. After meeting the necessary data requirement, 
we have 1,186 (589) firm-year observations for the period of 1997 to 2010 to estimate the probability that 
an ESG proposal is introduced (withdrawn).  
                                                            
18 For a “behind-the-scenes” look at private ESG engagements, please see Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), 
Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009), Bauer et al. (2013), and Dimson et al. (2015). These studies provide valuable 
insights into ESG activism by securing proprietary data from one activist fund. McCahery et al. (2016) surveyed 143 
institutional investors, who are mostly very large and with a long-term focus. They provide direct evidence for how 
those investors intervene behind-the-scenes in governance issues. 
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To get firm-level local institutional ownership (Agg. Localown), we sum local institutional 
ownership of all the facilities owned by a firm without duplication. Following the literature (see, e.g., 
Chhaochharia et al., 2012), we use a logistic model and control for firm size, firm age, ROA, the market-
to-book ratio, leverage, and sales growth to estimate the impact of local institutional investors on the 
likelihood that an ESG proposal is introduced or withdrawn. In Table 7 Panel A, we find that local 
ownerships by SRI funds and public pension funds are more significantly and negatively related to facility 
toxic release than local ownership by other types of institutional investors. Therefore, we also run the logit 
model and compare the effect of local SRI funds and local public pension funds to other types of local 
institutional investors in terms of this direct measure of shareholder engagement. Similarly to Agg. 
Localown, we sum local ownerships by SRI funds (Agg. Localown_SRI), public pension funds (Agg. 
Localown_Public pension fund), and other types of institutional investors (Agg. 
Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund) of all the facilities owned by a firm without duplication. 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 10 report the estimation results when the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm receives an ESG proposal. Consistent with the overall evidence, 
local institutional ownership (Agg. Localown) is significantly and positively related to the probability that 
an ESG proposal is introduced (column 1). In corroboration with Table 7 Panel A, Agg. Localown_SRI and 
Agg. Localown_Public pension fund are more significantly and positively related to the likelihood that a 
firm receives an ESG proposal than Agg. Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund. Columns (5)-(8) report the 
estimation results when the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an ESG 
proposal was withdrawn as described under Other Status by ISS and zero otherwise. We find similar results 
for the probability that an ESG proposal is withdrawn. Specifically, local institutional ownership (Agg. 
Localown) is significantly and positively related to the probability of withdrawal, and local ownerships by 
SRI funds and public pension funds are more significantly and positively related to the probability of 
withdrawal than local ownership by other types of institutional investors. 
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5. Conclusion   
In the past two decades, corporations have come under enormous pressure to be socially 
responsible. However, questions remain as to whether institutional investors care about sustainability 
issues, and if they do, whether they have any influence on corporate environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) policies. To address these questions, we analyze the relation between the ownership of local 
institutional investors and the amount of toxic chemicals released into the environment by the nearby 
facility for a sample of 3,907 institutional investors from 1994 to 2010. By focusing on this unique segment 
of ESG—the pollution aspect of corporate environmental policies, we aim to grasp the tension behind the 
debate of whether institutional investors should engage corporations in ESG. Pollution represents a classic 
example of negative externalities and therefore corporate pollution abatement practices should fall outside 
the domain of corporate activities.  
We develop and test the local preference hypothesis based on the economic theory of transaction 
costs (Coase, 1937 and 1960) and the recent theoretical advancement in the ESG literature—the delegated 
philanthropy theory that Bénabou and Tirole (2010) propose to explain the exponential movement of ESG 
over the past two decades. We find a portfolio of evidence in support of the local preference hypothesis. 
Specifically, local institutional ownership is consistently and negatively related to facility toxic release. 
This negative relation is stronger for local SRI funds and local public pension funds than for other types of 
local institutional investors. There is some evidence that local ownership by dedicated institutional investors 
is more negatively related to facility toxic release than that by their transient counterparts. Local 
institutional ownership is more negatively associated with facility pollution in communities that prefer more 
stringent environmental policies and in communities of greater collective cohesiveness. Lastly, we find a 
positive link between local institutional ownership and the probability that an ESG proposal is either 
introduced or withdrawn. This positive relation is also stronger for local SRI funds and local public pension 
funds than for other types of local institutional investors. 
In their concluding remark, Bénabou and Tirole (2010) note on page 15: “While the invisible hand 
of the market and the more visible one of the state have been the objects of much research, we still know 
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little about the decentralized correction of externalities.” This paper enhances our understanding of the role 
of institutional investors in ESG by developing and testing the local preference hypothesis, which highlights 
the drivers behind the heterogeneous preferences among institutional investors for corporate environmental 
issues (i.e., internalization of externalities and self-image concerns) and the conditions under which 
institutional investors are more effective in influencing corporate environmental issues—when they possess 
a greater amount of soft information and tacit knowledge, have closer social ties with the firm and the local 
community, and face lower coordination costs. The 2013 UNGC survey reports that 85% of the CEOs 
surveyed demand clearer government policies and market signals to support corporate sustainability 
initiatives. Our results suggest that institutional investors have the potential to play an important role in 
sending the market signal to the firm. 
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Appendix I: The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database 
 
Overview: 
The TRI was established by Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 
1986 and was later expanded by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. Facilities with ten or more employees that 
produce or use an above-a-threshold amount of chemicals on the EPA’s substance list are required to report annual 
quantities of on-site toxic release to various media and the quantities of off-site transfers. The term “release” was 
created by Congress to describe the portion of toxic waste that is discharged directly into the environment. The TRI 
data were first collected in reporting year (calendar year) 1987 and released in 1989. Prior to the TRI, no record of 
toxic emission existed. TRI data are submitted annually to the EPA and are made available to the general public two 
years after the data are reported due to the limitations of staff resources to process the data. 
 
Data quality: 
“Since its first release in 1989, the TRI data have become the primary measure of a plant’s environmental 
performance” (Prechel and Zheng, 2012, page 958) and are used extensively by environmental activists, regulators, 
ESG ratings agencies, and academics. Researchers have shown that the data provide a valid and reliable means of 
measuring corporate toxic emissions and have been subject to a high degree of scrutiny (see, e.g., Arora and Cason, 
1995; Hamilton, 1995; Grant et al., 2010). For example, Natan and Miller (1998, page 368) note that “TRI is the best 
source of data nationwide on toxic release to the environment.” As another example, in a 2006 joint letter, Dr. M. 
Granger Morgan, then Chair of the EPA Science Advisory Board, and Dr. Maureen Cropper, then Chair of the SAB 
Environmental Economics Advisory Committee, wrote [emphasis added]: “TRI data are widely used to evaluate 
changes in facility and firm environmental performance, to conduct risk assessments of changes in toxic release levels, 
and to conduct spatial analyses of toxic hazards. The TRI data provide the only reliable source of longitudinal data 
for this type of research. Over 120 scholarly articles have been published using the Toxics Release Inventory data to 
address a wide range of public health, economic and social science issues.”19 
 
Limitations: 
Although the TRI has been widely accepted as the best available source of data for measuring a facility’s 
toxic release, like any other database, it has limitations. First, the TRI data are self-reported by facilities, not the actual 
measurement of toxic release. Therefore, it is subject to reporting noise, errors, and potential manipulation. An 
example of reporting noise can be a change in estimation method, which may reduce the amount reported, even though 
the physical amount of the toxic chemical released did not change. An example of a reporting error can be forgetting 
to fill in the amount for a chemical. Electronic data entry has significantly reduced this error, as the submitter will not 
be prompted to the next webpage unless all entries have been filled. Similar to any other reporting, such as financial 
statements reporting, TRI reporting can be manipulated. However, scholars argue that routine environmental audits 
can substantially reduce the incentive to misreport (Arora and Cason, 1995). To ensure accurate reporting, the EPA 
has also implemented a series of policies and initiatives including providing reporting training and helplines to 
facilities, conducting data quality checks before as well as after the data are released to the public, conducting on-site 
inspections, and taking enforcement actions. It is important to note that smaller firms and firms reporting in the earlier 
years, when the TRI was first implemented, are more likely to misreport due to a lack of resources and experience. 
Our sample period starts in 1994, the sixth year after the TRI data were first released. Our sample consists of larger 
facilities, which should be under greater scrutiny and pressure to report accurate data. These characteristics of our 
sample should mitigate the concern of TRI reporting errors for this study. 
Second, the TRI does not cover all the economic sectors or all chemicals. The TRI includes only the 
manufacturing sector and the seven sectors added in 1998: metal mining, coal mining, electric utilities, chemical 
wholesale distributors, petroleum bulk storage/terminals, hazardous waste management facilities, and solvent recovery 
facilities. The TRI generally records releases that are not regulated and may not include all the chemicals identified as 
                                                            
19 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100JNO9.PDF?Dockey=P100JNO9.PDF.  
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toxic by other environmental legislation or government agencies. Despite this data limitation, it is not obvious to us 
that our results are thereby biased or cannot be generalized to other industry sectors.    
Third, the TRI provides information on the quantity of a toxic chemical released from a facility, but not all 
the information necessary to answer questions about health risks. However, following the literature, we use the TRI 
data and calculate an alternative measure of toxic release that takes into consideration the potential health risks of a 
chemical. Specifically, we follow King and Lenox (2000) and calculate the weighted sum of toxic release by weighting 
each chemical by its toxicity. As column (2) of Appendix III shows, our results hold when we use this alternative 
measure of toxic release. We do not use weighted toxic release as our main measure because the norm of the literature 
is to use the unweighted measure (i.e., the log transformation of the simple summation plus one) (Doshi, Dowell, and 
Toffel, 2013). One shortcoming of using weighted toxic release is that toxicity weights are frequently missing, which 
is mostly due to a lack of information needed to generate a toxicity weight.  
 
Correlation with the KLD scores: 
Another popular proxy for ESG performance is the KLD rating. The KLD rating is a cumulative score based 
on KLD’s assessment of a firm’s CSR performance in seven broad categories: community relations, corporate 
governance, employee relations, diversity, environment, human rights, and product quality and safety. KLD considers 
emissions of toxic chemicals in TRI reports when rating a firm’s environmental performance. In untabulated analysis, 
we aggregate facility-level toxics release data to firm-level, and study the correlation between the KLD scores and our 
toxic release measures. We find that the overall KLD score is significantly and negatively correlated with the natural 
logarithm of one plus the amount of total, on-site, and off-site toxic release. The correlation coefficient is the highest 
for on-site toxic release (coefficient=-0.072), followed by total toxic release (coefficient = -0.058) and off-site toxic 
release (coefficient = -0.017). The KLD environmental score is also significantly and negatively correlated with the 
natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total, on-site, and off-site toxic release. The correlation coefficient is the 
highest for on-site toxic release (coefficient=-0.199), followed by total toxic release (coefficient=-0.172) and off-site 
toxic release (coefficient=-0.063). Therefore, while our toxic release measure is significantly correlated with the KLD 
scores, the coefficient magnitude is small, suggesting that the former conveys a substantially large proportion of 
information not covered by the latter. It is also worth noting that compared to KLD, the TRI has the important 
advantage of being freely available to the public. 
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Appendix II: Variable description 
 
This appendix provides variable definitions and computations. In parentheses, capitalized, and in italics, we also 
provide the mnemonics associated with each Compustat variable. 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Panel A: Toxic release variables 
 Total toxic release The natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total release of toxic chemicals in 
pounds of a facility  
 On-site toxic release The natural logarithm of one plus the amount of toxic release in pounds at the 
location of a facility  
 Off-site toxic release The natural logarithm of one plus the amount of toxic release in pounds off the 
location of a facility  
 Weighted toxic release The natural logarithm of one plus the amount of toxic release in pounds of a facility, 
weighting each chemical by the inverse of its Reportable Quantity (RQ) 
 Residual release The difference between total toxic release (defined as above) and the predicted 
amount of total toxic release that we estimate based on facility size, the three-digit 
SIC code, and year, following King and Lenox (2002). 
   
Panel B: Variables of institutional investors 
 Localown Equity ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the facility 
 Totalown Total institutional ownership of the firm 
 Localown_SRI Equity ownership of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds located within 150 
miles of the facility. We identify SRI funds using the data source of SocialFunds 
(Edmans, 2011). 
 Localown_Public pension 
fund 
Equity ownership of public pension funds located within 150 miles of the facility. 
We obtain the identities of public pension funds from Bushee’s website, 
http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIvars.html. 
 Localown_NonSRI_ 
NonPensionFund 
Equity ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the facility, 
excluding local ownerships by SRI funds and public pension funds 
 Localown_DED Equity ownership of dedicated institutional investors as defined in Bushee (2001) 
located within 150 miles of the facility. Identities of dedicated institutions come from 
Bushee’s website, http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIvars.html. 
 Localown_TRA Equity ownership of transient institutional investors as defined in Bushee (2001) 
located within 150 miles of the facility. Identities of transient institutions come from 
Bushee’s website, http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIvars.html. 
 Localown_HQ Equity ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the corporate 
headquarters. We obtain headquarters data for the period of 1994–2006 from 
Compact Disclosure and for the period of 2007–2010 from the CRSP-Compustat 
Merged Database. 
 Agg. Localown Sum of local institutional ownership—localown—of all the facilities owned by a 
firm without duplication 
 Agg. Localown_SRI Sum of local ownership by SRI funds—localown_SRI—of all the facilities owned 
by a firm without duplication 
 Agg. Localown_Public 
pension fund 
Sum of local ownership by public pension funds—localown_Public pension fund—
of all the facilities owned by a firm without duplication 
 Agg. Localown_nonSRI 
_nonPublic pension fund 
Sum of local ownership by institutional investors that are not SRI funds or public 
pension funds—localown_nonSRI_nonPublicFund—of all the facilities owned by a 
firm without duplication 
   
Panel C: Variables of firm characteristics 
 Facility_size The natural logarithm of the number of employees at a facility (from the National 
Establishment Time-Series (NETS) Database) 
 Firm_size  The natural logarithm of firm total assets (AT) 
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 Firm_age The natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was included in the 
Compustat database 
 Slack The ratio of cash plus short-term investments (CH+IVST) to total assets (AT) 
 Leverage The ratio of long term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC) to total 
assets (AT) 
 R&D/sales The ratio of R&D expenses to sales (XRD)/(SALE), set to zero if missing 
 AD/sales  The ratio of advertising expenses to sales (XAD)/(SALE), set to zero if missing 
 HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index, computed as the sum of squared market shares based 
on sales of a firm’s three-digit SIC industry  
 ROA Return on assets, which is computed as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary 
items (IB) to total asset (AT) 
 Market-to-book ratio The market value over the book value of common equity (CSHO*PRCC_F/CEQ) 
 Sales_growth  ((SALEt-SALEt-1)/SALEt) 
 %CEO ownership Percent of CEO stock ownership (from EXEUCOMP) 
   
Panel D: Other variables  
 Facility_HQ_distance The natural logarithm of the distance in miles between a facility and the firm’s 
headquarters 
 REG_stringency A measure of the stringency of a state’s environmental regulation. Following Meyer 
(1995) and King and Lenox (2001), we construct this variable as the inverse of the 
natural logarithm of the total amount of toxic release divided by the total number of 
employees in four main polluting industries: chemicals, petroleum, pulp and paper, 
and materials processing for a state. A higher value of REG_stringency indicates 
greater stringency. 
 EPA dummy An indicator variable that takes the value of one if any of the three EPA headquarters 
and ten regional offices is within 150 miles of the facility and zero otherwise 
 Effluent violations  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of effluent violations  
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Appendix III: Additional robustness check 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results. The unit of analysis is facility year. The main independent variable of 
interest is stockholdings by institutional investors located within 150 miles of the emitting facility (localown). Variable 
definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix I. Each regression includes a constant. t statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
Dependent variable = 
Residual 
release 
Weighted 
release 
Total toxic release 
Effluent 
violations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Localown -4.419** -1.911** -4.839*** -4.143** -3.349** -3.366** 
  (-2.47) (-1.98) (-2.77) (-2.43) (-2.55) (-1.91) 
Localown_HQ   1.535      
    (1.30)      
EPA_dummy     -0.524**    
      (-1.98)    
Facility_size -0.019 0.452*** 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.609*** -0.002 
  (-0.39) (10.08) (8.31) (8.37) (9.63) (-1.11) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.046 -0.083** -0.119** -0.118** -0.108** 0.002 
  (-0.85) (-2.05) (-2.31) (-2.28) (-2.40) (0.54) 
REG_stringency -9.735*** -7.401** -11.360*** -11.291*** -6.543*** -0.106 
  (-3.23) (-2.51) (-3.40) (-3.43) (-3.55) (-0.86) 
Firm_size       0.006  
        (0.07)  
Firm_age       -0.214  
        (-1.08)  
Slack       0.094  
        (0.26)  
Leverage       0.206  
        (0.76)  
R&D / sales       -3.439  
        (-1.12)  
AD / sales       -9.440  
        (-1.14)  
HHI       -0.233  
        (-0.44)  
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM×YEAR FE YES YES YES YES NO YES 
MSA×YEAR FE YES YES YES YES NO YES 
Year FE NA NA NA NA YES NA 
Observations 31,428 38,483 38,483 38,483 42,585 4,433 
Adj. R-squared 0.096 0.311 0.358 0.358 0.421 0.407 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics  
 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses for the full sample (i.e., 3,907 
institutional investors, 5,049 unique facilities, and 770 unique firms) from 1994 to 2010. To mitigate the concern of 
extreme outliers, we use the natural log transformation for large positive numbers (i.e., the toxic release variables, 
facility_size, firm_size, firm_age, and facility_HQ_distance), while winsorizing the other variables at 1% at both tails. 
See Appendix II for variable definitions and descriptions. 
 
    N Mean Std. Min Max 
Panel A: Toxic chemical releases at facility      
  Total toxic release 38,483 6.803 4.573 0.000 19.842 
  On-site toxic release 38,483 5.858 4.740 0.000 19.842 
  Off-site toxic release 38,483 2.809 4.045 0.000 17.546 
 Residual release 31,428 -0.029 3.631 -8.427 7.425 
  Weighted release 38,483 2.836 3.202 0.000 11.903 
    
     
Panel B: Institutional ownership      
  Localown  38,483 0.030 0.067 0.000 0.642 
  Totalown 38,483 0.564 0.280 0.000 1.000 
 Localown_SRI 38,483 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.145 
 Localown_Public pension fund 38,483 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.045 
 Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund 38,483 0.026 0.057 0.000 0.307 
 Localown_Hedge fund 38,483 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.053 
  Localown_DED 38,483 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.120 
  Localown_TRA 38,483 0.006 0.016 0.000 0.121 
  Localown_HQ 38,483 0.117 0.113 0.000 0.592 
      
Panel C: Other variables      
 Facility_size 38,483 4.951 1.444 0.000 9.903 
 Facility_HQ_distance 38,483 5.921 1.572 0.000 8.411 
 REG_stringency 38,483 0.155 0.030 0.111 0.274 
  Firm_size 38,483 7.798 1.575 -1.528 12.269 
  Firm_age  38,483 3.124 0.857 0.693 4.094 
  Slack 38,483 0.067 0.094 0.000 1.047 
  Leverage 38,483 0.288 0.167 0.000 0.949 
  R&D/Sales 38,483 0.016 0.027 0.000 0.236 
  AD/Sales  38,483 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.114 
  HHI 38,483 0.194 0.158 0.031 1.000 
 ROA 38,483 0.149 0.069 -0.312 0.574 
 Market-to-book ratio 38,483 2.734 2.191 0.415  16.142 
 Sales_growth 38,483 0.072 0.208 -0.591 1.249 
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Table 2 
Impact of local institutional ownership on toxic release  
 
This table reports the regression results of the baseline model (Equation 2), which employs the OLS method to estimate 
the effect of local institutional ownership (localown) on the amount of toxic release from a facility. The unit of analysis 
is facility year. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total (total), on-site (on-
site), and off-site (off-site) releases of toxic chemicals by the facility. The main independent variable of interest is 
equity ownership of institutions located within 150 miles of the facility that releases the toxic chemicals into the 
environment. Variable definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a constant. 
t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 Dependent variable = Toxic release 
 Total On-site Off-site 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Localown -4.690*** -4.023** -1.270 
  (-2.73) (-2.27) (-1.02) 
Facility_size 0.660*** 0.637*** 0.435*** 
  (8.32) (7.81) (7.49) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.118** -0.151*** -0.006 
  (-2.29) (-2.72) (-0.11) 
REG_stringency -11.400*** -9.717*** -5.680* 
  (-3.41) (-2.68) (-1.78) 
FIRM FE YES YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES YES 
Observations 38,483 38,483 38,483 
Adj. R-squared 0.358 0.368 0.254 
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Table 3 
Endogeneity check: Subsample analyses 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results from regressing the amount of total toxic release from a facility on local 
institutional ownership. The unit of analysis is facility year. We rank each observation into three groups based on a 
firm’s yearly CSR or environmental scores obtained from the KLD database. High (Low) denotes the top (bottom) 
group. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release by the facility 
(total toxic release). The main independent variable of interest is equity ownership of institutional investors located 
within 150 miles of the facility that releases the toxic chemicals into the environment (localown). Variable definitions 
and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a constant. t statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels 
of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
 CSR scores  Environmental scores 
 Low  High   Low  High  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Localown -6.989*** -7.618**  -4.834* -10.588** 
  (-3.10) (-2.50)  (-1.80) (-2.60) 
Facility_size 0.588*** 0.541***  0.821*** 0.454*** 
  (4.48) (6.01)  (7.83) (3.18) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.135* -0.192**  -0.132 -0.282** 
  (-1.77) (-2.59)  (-1.43) (-2.32) 
REG_stringency -7.731 -20.834***  -6.321 -31.864*** 
 (-1.38) (-2.98)  (-1.04) (-4.81) 
FIRM FE YES YES  YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES  YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 6,716 6,388  6,500 4,836 
Adj. R-squared 0.311 0.326  0.345 0.312 
Coefficient equality test: Localown (1) = (2)  (3) = (4) 
T-statistics -0.17  -0.72 
(p-value) (0.87)  (0.47) 
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Table 4 
Endogeneity check: Quasi-natural experiment due to institutional investor mergers 
 
This table reports the DID estimation results, assessing the relation between local institutional ownership and facility 
toxic release using the quasi-natural experiment of institutional investor mergers. The unit of analysis is facility year. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release by the facility (total toxic 
release). The main independent variable of interest is Treatment*Post. Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the facility is in the treatment group and zero if in the control group. We classify a facility into the treatment 
group if an institutional investor located within 150 miles of the facility was acquired by a distant institutional investor 
(i.e., located outside the 150-mile radius of the facility). The control group includes those facilities that were owned 
by the same parent company but did not experience any change in the composition of local institutional investors. 
Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the sample year is after the merger event and zero if before 
the merger. Definitions and descriptions for other variables are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a 
constant. t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-
tailed test. 
 
   Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
  Full sample [-5, 5] year window 
  Predicted sign (1) (2) 
Treatment * Post (+) 1.345** 1.441** 
  (2.15) (2.13) 
Treatment  -0.622 -0.760 
  (-0.79) (-0.97) 
Facility_size  1.162*** 1.250*** 
  (10.74) (10.29) 
Facility_HQ_distance  0.105 0.263* 
  (0.92) (1.91) 
REG_stringency  -9.031 -11.864 
  (-1.31) (-1.41) 
FIRM FE  YES YES 
MSA FE  YES YES 
FIRM×YEAR FE  YES YES 
MSA×YEAR FE  YES YES 
Observations  5,909 3,479 
Adj. R-squared  0.402 0.403 
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Table 5 
Endogeneity check: Quasi-natural experiment due to facility relocation 
 
This table reports the DID estimation results, assessing the relation between local institutional ownership and facility 
toxic release using the quasi-natural experiment of facility relocation. The unit of analysis is facility year. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release by the facility (total toxic 
release). The main independent variable of interest is localown_increase_dummy*post. Localown_increase_dummy 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the local institutional ownership (localown) is higher in the post-relocation 
period than in the pre-relocation period. Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of one, if the facility-year 
observation falls into the post-relocation period and zero if the pre-relocation period. We define localown as 
stockholdings by institutional investors located within 150 miles of the emitting facility. Definitions and descriptions 
for other variables are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a constant. t statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
  Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
  Predicted sign (1) 
Localown_increase_dummy * Post (-) -1.135* 
   (-1.97) 
Post  1.037 
   (1.30) 
Localown_increase_dummy  -4.536*** 
   (-8.74) 
Facility_size  -0.065 
   (-0.30) 
Facility_HQ_distance  0.567*** 
   (5.52) 
REG_stringency  -2.200 
   (-0.44) 
Firm_size  -0.294 
   (-1.22) 
Firm_age  0.676 
   (0.68) 
Slack  -0.986 
   (-0.70) 
Leverage  1.241 
   (0.89) 
R&D / sales  -7.456 
   (-0.68) 
AD / sales  -41.364 
   (-1.62) 
HHI  -0.091 
   (-0.04) 
FIRM, YEAR, and MSA FE  YES 
Observations  756 
Adj. R-squared  0.798 
 
  
51 
 
Table 6 
Endogeneity check: The change-on-change analysis 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results. The unit of analysis is facility year. The main variables of interest are 
the lagged changes in local institutional ownership (Δlocalownt-1) and the changes in the natural logarithm of one plus 
the total amount of toxic release (Δtotal toxic releaset-1). The sample is divided into facilities that increased toxic 
release from year t-1 to year t (Positive change) and facilities that decreased toxic release from year t-1 to year t 
(Negative change). Variable definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. t statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: 
Dependent variable = ΔTotal toxic releaset 
 Positive change Negative change 
 (1) (2) 
ΔLocalownt-1 -1.612** -0.659 
  (-1.99) (-0.68) 
Total toxic releaset-1 -0.279*** 0.036*** 
  (-11.74) (2.87) 
ΔFacility_sizet-1 0.012 -0.022 
 (0.24) (-0.59) 
ΔREG_stringencyt-1 4.312 -9.914 
  (0.59) (-1.38) 
FIRM FE YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES 
Observations 9,309 11,643 
Adj. R-squared 0.309 0.038 
 
Panel B: 
Dependent variable = ΔLocalownt 
 Positive change Negative change 
 (1) (2) 
ΔTotal toxic releaset-1 0.000 0.000 
  (1.29) (1.60) 
Localownt-1 -0.308*** -0.325*** 
 (-3.14) (-4.29) 
ΔFacility_size t-1 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.91) (0.96) 
ΔREG_stringencyt-1 0.029 -0.010 
  (0.63) (-0.18) 
FIRM FE YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES 
Observations 7,978 10,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.138 0.196 
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Table 7 
Impact of local institutional investors on toxic release, discriminating between institution types 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results from estimating the effect of equity ownership by different types of local 
institutional investors on the amount of toxic chemicals released into the environment by the nearby facility. The unit 
of analysis is facility year. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release 
by the facility (total toxic release). In Panel A, the main independent variables of interest are local ownerships by SRI 
funds (localown_SRI), public pension funds (Localown_Public pension fund), and other institutional investors that are 
not SRI funds or public pension funds (Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund). Localown_Hedge fund denotes local 
ownership by hedge funds. In Panel B, the main independent variables of interest are local ownership by dedicated 
(Localown_DED) and transient (Localown_TRA) institutional investors. Local ownership is defined as equity 
ownership by institutional investors located within 150 miles of the facility that releases the toxic chemicals into the 
environment. Variable definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a constant. 
t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: Evidence from local SRI funds and local public pension funds vs. other local institutional investors 
  Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(S) Localown_SRI -20.427***      
  (-2.59)      
(P) Localown_Public pension fund   -36.867**    
    (-2.32)    
(N) Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund     -4.912**  
      (-2.25)  
Localown_Hedge fund    -4.942 
    (-0.28) 
Facility_size 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.661*** 0.663*** 
  (8.34) (8.34) (8.32) (8.33) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.102* -0.102* -0.118** -0.102* 
  (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.28) (-1.93) 
REG_stringency -11.783*** -11.846*** -11.528*** -11.915*** 
  (-3.53) (-3.54) (-3.45) (-3.54) 
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES YES YES 
FIRM×YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
MSA×YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 38,483 38,483 38,483 38,483 
Adj. R-squared 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.356 
Coefficient equality test:   (S)=(N) (P)=(N)    
T-statistics 1.99 2.62    
(p-value) (0.05) (<0.01)    
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Panel B: Evidence from dedicated vs. transient institutional investors 
 Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
 (1) (2) 
(D) Localown_DED -9.799**   
  (-2.34)   
(T) Localown_TRA   -8.118 
    (-1.57) 
Facility_size 0.662*** 0.662*** 
  (8.33) (8.30) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.101* -0.105** 
  (-1.93) (-2.01) 
REG_stringency -11.628*** -11.751*** 
  (-3.46) (-3.50) 
FIRM FE YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES 
FIRM×YEAR FE YES YES 
MSA×YEAR FE YES YES 
Observations 38,483 38,483 
Adj. R-squared 0.357 0.356 
Coefficient equality test:  (D)=(T) 
T-statistics 0.32 
(p-value) (0.75) 
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Table 8 
Impact of local institutional investors, conditioned on a community’s proclivity toward stricter environmental policies 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results from estimating the effect of local institutional ownership on the amount 
of toxic chemicals released into the environment by the nearby facility, partitioning the sample based on whether the 
facility is located in a community that prefers stronger environmental policies. The unit of analysis is facility year. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release by the facility (total toxic 
release). The main independent variable of interest is the equity ownership of institutional investors located within 
150 miles of the facility (localown) that releases the toxic chemicals into the environment. For each regression, we 
rank the observations into three groups based on county-level proxies for a community’s proclivity toward stricter 
environmental policies. High and Low denote top and bottom terciles, respectively. The Democrat/Republican ratio is 
the ratio of votes for the Democratic presidential candidate over votes for the Republican presidential candidate during 
the presidential election every four years. The religious adherence ratio is the adjusted rate of religious adherents per 
1000 population recorded in 2000. The age>=65 and <=18 ratio is the annual ratio of people above age 65 or younger 
than 18 years of age over the total population in a county. The female ratio is the annual ratio of females over the total 
population in a county. Variable definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a 
constant. t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-
tailed test. 
 
 Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
 
Democrats / 
republicans ratio 
 
Religious adherence 
ratio 
 
Age>=65 and  
<=18 ratio 
 Female ratio 
 High  Low   High  Low   High  Low   High  Low  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Localown -5.936*** -4.390  -7.901*** -3.625  -9.243** -1.351  -5.564** -3.427 
  (-2.68) (-1.17)  (-2.96) (-1.01)  (-2.48) (-0.66)  (-2.47) (-0.88) 
Facility_size 0.836*** 0.723***  0.867*** 0.670***  0.854*** 0.553***  0.719*** 0.704*** 
  (7.99) (5.62)  (5.52) (4.69)  (6.16) (6.21)  (6.67) (6.80) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.204*** -0.103  -0.018 -0.104  -0.058 -0.081  -0.119 -0.060 
  (-2.60) (-1.07)  (-0.12) (-0.76)  (-0.44) (-0.95)  (-1.02) (-0.54) 
REG_stringency -17.009*** 0.739  -11.297 -14.948**  -8.562 -17.206*  -6.485 -18.848** 
 (-2.91) (0.14)  (-1.60) (-2.04)  (-1.64) (-1.86)  (-1.05) (-2.29) 
FIRM FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 10,811 11,250  10,888 10,562  11,004 10,430  11,125 10,728 
Adj. R-squared 0.362 0.340  0.339 0.407  0.352 0.378  0.326 0.373 
Coefficient equality 
test: Localown 
(1)=(2) 
 
(3)=(4)  (5)=(6) 
 
(7)=(8) 
T-statistics 0.26  1.04  1.80  0.55 
(p-value) (0.79)  (0.30)  (0.07)  (0.58) 
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Table 9 
Impact of local institutional investors, conditioned on a community’s collective cohesiveness 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results from estimating the effect of local institutional ownership on the amount 
of toxic chemicals released into the environment by the nearby facility, partitioning the sample based on whether the 
facility is located in communities of greater collective cohesiveness. The unit of analysis is facility year. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of toxic release by the facility (total toxic release). The 
main independent variable of interest is the equity ownership of institutional investors located within 150 miles of the 
facility (localown) that releases the toxic chemicals into the environment. For each regression, we rank the 
observations into three groups based on county-level proxies for a community’s collective cohesiveness. High and 
Low denote top and bottom terciles, respectively. The voter turnout rate is the total votes cast in a general election 
over the total population in a county. The Caucasian ratio is yearly total number of Caucasians over the total population 
in a county. Variable definitions and descriptions are provided in Appendix II. Each regression includes a constant. t 
statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 Dependent variable = Total toxic release 
 Voter turnout  Caucasian ratio 
 High  Low   High  Low  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Localown -8.298*** -1.595  -7.685** -4.195 
  (-3.12) (-0.37)  (-2.53) (-1.27) 
Facility_size 0.613*** 0.674***  0.832*** 0.762*** 
  (5.70) (4.64)  (7.58) (5.51) 
Facility_HQ_distance -0.139 -0.095  -0.250** -0.062 
  (-1.40) (-0.84)  (-2.28) (-0.53) 
REG_stringency -12.081** -8.541  -9.797* -2.598 
 (-2.13) (-1.42)  (-1.66) (-0.42) 
FIRM FE YES YES  YES YES 
MSA FE YES YES  YES YES 
FIRM FE × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES 
MSA × YEAR FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 10,990 11,231  11,652 10,953 
Adj. R-squared 0.350 0.372  0.358 0.387 
Coefficient equality test: Localown (1) = (2)  (3) = (4) 
T-statistics 1.68  1.78 
(p-value) (0.09)  (0.08) 
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Table 10 
Impact of local institutional ownership: Evidence from shareholder proposals 
 
This table reports the regression results from estimating a logistic model, relating equity ownership by local 
institutional investors to the likelihood that an ESG proposal is introduced or withdrawn. The dependent variable in 
columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm receives a socially responsible initiative (SRI) 
proposal, as designated by ISS, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if an SRI-designated proposal is withdrawn. The main independent variables of interest are 
aggregated firm-level equity ownership by institutional investors located within 150 miles of the firm’s facilities that 
release toxic chemicals into the environment (Agg. Localown), by local SRI funds (Agg. Localown_SRI), by local 
public pension funds (Agg. Localown_Public pension fund), and by other local institutional investors that are not SRI 
funds or public pension funds (Agg. Localown_NonSRI_NonPensionFund). Variable definitions and descriptions are 
provided in Appendix II. Industry FE are created based on 2-digit SIC codes. Reported coefficients are marginal 
effects. Each regression includes a constant. z statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
Dependent variable = Prob (a firm receives an ESG proposal) =1 Prob (an ESG proposal is withdrawn) =1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Agg. Localown 0.196**       0.064**       
  (1.98)       (1.99)       
(S) Agg. Localown_SRI    2.436**       1.285**     
    (2.40)       (2.54)     
(P) Agg. Localown_     5.249*       2.027**   
      Public pension fund     (1.86)       (2.37)   
(N) Agg. Localown_      0.215*       0.198** 
       NonSRI_NonPensionFund       (1.76)       (2.09) 
Firm_size 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.062*** -0.081** -0.081** -0.068** -0.075** 
  (2.97) (3.39) (2.85) (2.92) (-2.56) (-2.58) (-2.35) (-2.48) 
ROA 0.837*** 0.865*** 0.869*** 0.831*** 0.407 0.333 0.912 0.835 
  (3.02) (3.01) (3.21) (3.03) (0.59) (0.49) (1.31) (1.24) 
Firm_age 0.002 -0.008 0.012 0.006 0.068 0.056 0.057 0.057 
  (0.05) (-0.19) (0.30) (0.16) (1.18) (0.98) (1.01) (0.98) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 
  (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.73) (-0.54) (0.67) (0.81) (0.64) (0.76) 
Leverage 0.173 0.164 0.169 0.179 0.362 0.379 0.436 0.459 
  (0.99) (0.97) (0.95) (1.00) (1.23) (1.31) (1.51) (1.58) 
Sales_growth -0.021 -0.004 -0.010 -0.023 0.270** 0.290** 0.280** 0.295** 
  (-0.22) (-0.04) (-0.10) (-0.24) (2.10) (2.33) (2.13) (2.22) 
Year & industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 589 589 589 589 
Pseudo R-squared 0.098 0.102 0.098 0.097 0.170 0.175 0.180 0.181 
Coefficient equality test     (S)=(N) (P)=(N)       (S)=(N) (P)=(N)   
Z-statistics   -2.35 -1.85     -2.00 -2.00   
(p-value)   (0.02) (0.07)     (0.05) (0.05)   
 
